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different from the one based on the Columbian tradition which has been so generally accepted.

E. L. STEVENSON.

Studies Military and Diplomatic. By CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.
(New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. v, 424.)

IN this volume of pungent and suggestive essays and addresses Mr. Adams continues his studies on the military history of the United States and upon the diplomatic features of the Civil War with which his father was connected as minister to England. The unifying idea which runs through all the papers, military or diplomatic, upon the Civil War, is that the outcome was really decided not by the Northern armies but by the pressure of the blockade and that the decision by the English not to intervene for the purpose of opening the Southern ports was the one point on which the result of the whole struggle depended. Probably Mr. Adams does not literally mean all that his words apparently say. It is a certain vivacity of expression characteristic of his inheritance which leads him to maintain in one place that a woman, Mrs. Stowe, really decided the Civil War through the effect of her *Uncle Tom's Cabin* upon English lower middle-class sentiment; and in another place to ascribe the same outcome to the individual preference of Palmerston for giving a rebuke to Gladstone rather than seeming to follow his lead in recognizing Confederate independence. It is noteworthy, however, that in all his observations on the military events, Mr. Adams pays little attention to the progress of the western campaigns, which like a great turning movement finally swept the armies of the Confederacy back to the Atlantic seaboard, and concentrates his interest on the fortunes of the Virginia contest. One gets the impression that the Civil War with which Mr. Adams is concerned is the one which was visible, as it were, from England. While no civilian student of the period can afford to neglect the important critique of Rhodes's *History of the United States* entitled *Some Phases of the Civil War*, he will be conscious in reading it that he is dealing with what may fairly be called an Adams Family view of the situation. The most valuable part of the book without doubt is to be found in the four papers on the American Revolution. Here Mr. Adams turns his powers of keen and fearless analysis upon a field which has hitherto been left, so far as American writers are concerned, to the unaided powers of civilians, for whose judgments Mr. Adams has an unbounded and freely-expressed contempt. Here too a central idea serves to unify the papers on Long Island, Washington and Cavalry, and The Revolutionary Campaign of 1777—the thesis that George Washington not only was not a military genius but was a positively bad general who was saved from the ruin which on military grounds he deserved, solely through the incompetence of Sir William Howe. With almost redundant detail Mr. Adams establishes that the attempted defense of

Long Island was an act of military folly and that the effort, by fighting, to keep Howe out of Philadelphia was as foolhardy as it was unnecessary. The illuminating criticism with which Mr. Adams dissects the campaigns of 1775, 1776, and 1777 makes his work a most welcome contribution to the proper understanding of these years. Every student of American history must feel gratitude for these papers and regret that the author did not deal with the later campaigns in the same way, the more especially since in 1781 he admits that the same Washington who heaped blunder on blunder in 1777, "carried out with prescience, judgment, skill and energy", a plan that was "boldly as well as brilliantly conceived". One need not be under the sway of the Washington myth, to suspect that the quality of the troops and the fullness of the other means at his disposal had rather more to do than Mr. Adams seems to imply with the failures of 1776 and 1777 and the success of 1781. It may even be doubted whether Napoleon, Frederick, or Wellington could have accomplished a great deal more than Washington did with such troops as he commanded in New York and Pennsylvania, even although we may fully agree with Mr. Adams that they would have made none of the blunders he so relentlessly points out.

THEODORE CLARKE SMITH.

Social Forces in American History. By A. M. SIMONS. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. ix, 325.)

THIS book was evidently written to illustrate a theory. The theory is Marx's economic interpretation of history, with its social class struggle, the rise of capitalism, the creation of a proletariat, and the inevitable social revolution. The author has examined American history with a view to ascertaining how far it can be made to fit into this theory. His aim is to discover those "social forces" which, according to his theory, are the fundamental factors in social evolution. Naturally he finds what he is looking for. Behind every great event in our history stalks the capitalist in some of his many guises, always seeking to gain some advantage for his class, and to exploit the masses. Everywhere appear contending social classes with their separate material interests and developing "class consciousness", each struggling to control the government and make use of its powers to gain some economic advantage. The Causes of Colonization are found in the social upheaval in Europe incident to the rule of the merchant class, which "was the first division of the capitalist army". "As fast as the merchant or manufacturing class obtained power, its members set about divorcing the former serfs and peasants from the soil . . . in order that the workers might be 'free' to hunt for employers. So it was that the people were being driven out of their ancient homes" to the colonies. The Revolution is explained in the same way. "It was, in reality, but one battle of a great world-wide struggle between contending social classes." "At